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Abstract—This paper presents a real-time non-probabilistic
detection mechanism to detect load-redistribution (LR) attacks
against energy management systems (EMSs). Prior studies have
shown that certain LR attacks can bypass conventional bad data
detectors (BDDs) and remain undetectable, which implies that
presence of a reliable and intelligent detection mechanism to flag
LR attacks, is imperative. Therefore, in this study a detection
mechanism to enhance the existing BDDs is proposed based on
the fundamental knowledge of the physics laws in the electric
grid. A greedy algorithm, which can optimize the core LR attack
problems, is presented to enable a fast mechanism to identify the
most sensitive locations for critical assets. The main contribution
of this detection mechanism is leveraging of power systems
domain insight to identify an underlying exploitable structure
for the core problem of LR attack problems, which enables
the prediction of the attackers’ behavior. Additional contribution
includes the ability to combine this approach with other detec-
tion mechanisms to increase their likelihood of detection. The
proposed approach is applied to 2383-bus Polish test system to
demonstrate the scalability of the greedy algorithm, and it solved
the attacker’s problem more than 10x faster than a traditional
linear optimization approach.
Index Terms—cyber-attack, false data injection attack (FDIA),
load-redistribution attacks detection, greedy algorithm, linear
programming (LP)
NOMENCLATURE
Sets and Indices
G Set of all generation units.
g Index for generation unit.
G(i) Set of all generation units at bus i (i ∈ N ).
i Index for bus.
K Set of all branches.
k Index for branch.
M Set of all measurements.
m Index for measurement.
N Set of all buses.
Parameters, Vectors and Matrices
α Load shift factor.
P¯g Fixed dispatch point of unit g ∈ G.
τ Residual-based bad data detector threshold.
cg Production cost of unit g ∈ G.
e nm × 1 vector of measurement noise error.
This work has been implemented to fulfill a part of the project: “A Verifiable
Framework for Cyber- Physical Attacks and Countermeasures in a Resilient
Electric Power Grid” funded by the Office of CYBER-PHYSICAL SYSTEMS
(CPS), Cyber Secur - Cyberinfrastruc under the National Science Foundation
(NSF), under Award Number 1449080.
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H nm × nb Jacobian matrix of the system.
H
′
nb × nb dependency matrix between power in-
jection measurements and state variables.
H
′
i i
th row of H
′
(i ∈ N ).
Li Fixed active load (MW) at bus i ∈ N .
lbi Lower bound for load deviation at each bus i ∈
N .
N1 Number of states that can be changed by at-
tacker.
nb Number of buses.
nm Number of measurements.
nbr Number of branches.
Pmaxg Upper limit on generation capacity of unit g ∈
G.
Pming Lower limit on generation capacity of unit g ∈
G.
Pmaxk Continuous rating of line k ∈ K.
PTDFRk,i Power transfer distribution factor for transmis-
sion asset k ∈ K and bus i ∈ N (injection) with
regard to reference bus R (withdrawal).
ubi Upper bound for load deviation at each bus i ∈
N .
Z nm × 1 vector of measurements.
Variables
H
′
ici(∆Li) Active load deviation at bus i ∈ N .
xˆ nb × 1 vector of estimated state variables.
c nb×1 vector of false data generated by attacker.
Pg Dispatch point of unit g ∈ G.
Pl Active power flow on target line l ∈ K.
x nb × 1 vector of actual state variables.
I. INTRODUCTION
IN power systems, state estimation (SE) is one of the keyfunctions of EMSs since many real-time operational and
market decisions are driven by its results. The SE is the process
of using fields’ measurements to estimate systems’ state vari-
ables with minimum error. Due to some limitations like sensor
calibration error, topology error, data transfer inaccuracy, and
cyber-attack, the received measurements (inputs to SE) are not
clean (noisy measurements), which would affect the accuracy
of the SE process. To reduce the effect of noisy measurements
on the SE process, state estimators are equipped with BDDs
to flag and remove noisy data.
False data injection attack (FDIA) against SE is a class of
cyber-attacks that attempts to maliciously change the mea-
surements and interfere in the SE process by targeting the
vulnerability of BDDs. BDDs are not looking for intelligent
ar
X
iv
:1
90
7.
13
29
4v
1 
 [e
es
s.S
Y]
  3
1 J
ul 
20
19
2attackers; rather, they are looking for physical limitation driven
events - measurement errors, faulty equipment, etc. Therefore,
it would be an easy task for intelligent attackers to bypass
BDDs and remain undetectable. The researchers in [1]–[3]
have shown the incapability of BDDs to detect generated
FDIAs against both direct current state estimation (DCSE)
and alternative current state estimation (ACSE) processes.
Likewise, they have addressed the conditions under which a
malicious attack could bypass BDDs and remain undetectable,
while it has been assumed that the attackers have complete
information of the systems. The researchers in [4] have
demonstrated that launching an FDIA with the least number
of measurements to be compromised without having access
to all measurements, is an NP-hard problem. To tackle this
issue, authors in [5]–[12] have attempted to generate FDIAs
with incomplete information about the systems’ topology by
applying heuristic methods, greedy algorithms, graph theoretic
approaches, and sparse optimization methods. The research
study in [13] has illustrated that even without any information
about the systems’ topology, attackers could construct unde-
tectable FDIAs.
In this study, the focus is on the LR attack, which is a kind
of implementing an FDIA. In LR attacks, the attackers attempt
to falsify bus injection measurements to either physically
or economically damage the systems. Various researchers
proposed bi-level or attacker-defender optimization problems
to model LR attacks with different objectives like maximizing
operation cost or maximizing power flow on a target line [14]–
[19]. Authors in [20] modeled a bi-level mixed integer linear
programming LR attack to address an LR attack that targets
multiple transmission assets. LR attacks with incomplete sys-
tems’ information are investigated in [17], [21], [22], where
the authors designed a problem to find the best local attacking
region.
Such prior research efforts have done a great job demon-
strating the vulnerability of traditional BDDs, which were
previously designed to detect anomalies caused by some
physical limitations. It is easy not to be detected when nobody
is looking for you or, in other words, “The greatest trick the
devil ever pulled was convincing the world he didn’t exist”
[23].
Now, the research community has obviously acknowledged
the existence of an attacker and his/her ability to remain
undetectable, which has pushed them to seek a solution. In
the first place, standing against the intelligent attackers could
be started by protecting power systems from FDIAs. Protection
refers to some pre-attack actions that make it hard for attackers
to launch an FDIA against power systems. In this regard, [24]
proposed to place secure PMUs at key buses in the system
to defend against FDIAs. Likewise, various techniques from
game theoretic models to greedy algorithms are suggested in
[25]–[31] for identifying the smallest set of key measurement
devices to be protected. However, referring to [32], attackers
still could launch an attack even when all measurements have
been protected against FDIAs, which implies the demand for
an intelligent false data detection scheme. Therefore, designing
intelligent false data detectors is the next way to stand against
intelligent attackers. Various FDIA detection methods are pro-
posed and developed in [33]–[44] based on various techniques
like Kalman filters, adaptive cumulative sum method, low-rank
decomposition (LD), Kullback-Leibler distance (KLD), sparse
optimization, machine learning, and deep learning.
In this study, we have developed a non-probabilistic de-
tection mechanism based on the fundamental knowledge of
the laws of physics and power systems to detect LR attacks
against DCSE. This is an online monitoring mechanism that
allows operators to track load changes (given a target asset)
at each iteration of the EMS and flag malicious or hazardous
set of deviations. Our main contributions are:
1) Leveraging power systems domain insight to identify an
underlying exploitable structure in LR attack problems,
which helps the operator to predict the attackers’ behav-
ior.
2) Mathematically proving the ability of a greedy algo-
rithm to solve the exploitable structure of LR attacks’
problems to optimality, which leads the system operator
to find the most sensitive locations at each iteration
of EMS very fast even for large interconnections that
distinguishes our approach from other approaches.
3) Developing an approach that is able to combine with
other approaches (e.g., ones that use machine learning)
to increase their likelihood of detection.
This paper is organized as follows. Sec. II presents a short
background on DCSE, the condition to launch an undetectable
FDIA against DCSE, and LR attacks. Sec. III is divided
into two subsections; the first one develops a single level LP
problem as the core problem of more sophisticated LR attack
problems and the second one provides a mathematical proof
to demonstrate the ability of a greedy algorithm to obtain
the global optimum for the proposed core problem of LR
attack problems. Sec. IV and V present simulation results and
concluding remarks, respectively.
II. BACKGROUND
In this section, the DCSE process and the procedure to
create an undetectable FDIA against it are described in II-A.
Likewise, in II-B, an LR-based FDIA is introduced.
A. DCSE and Undetectable FDIA
In the DCSE process, measurements are related to state vari-
ables (voltage angles) via linear equations. Eq. II.1 represents
these linear equations in a matrix form:
Z = Hx+ e (II.1)
Where Z is the nm × 1 vector of measurements, x is the
nb×1 vector of actual state variables of the system that needs
to be estimated, H is the nm × nb Jacobian matrix of the
system, and e represents the nm × 1 vector of measurement
noise error.
A common approach to measure the accuracy of the SE
process is to compare the L2-norm of measurements residual,
which is the difference between the vector of received mea-
surements from measuring units and estimated measurements
after the SE process, with a certain threshold (τ ). Therefore,
3if the value of the residual for a set of measurements Z be
greater than τ , it means that set of measurements contains
unacceptable bad data that should be removed. The residual
value is defined as follow where xˆ is the nb × 1 vector of
estimated states:
R = ||Z −Hxˆ|| (II.2)
A key theorem in [1] states that the contaminated measure-
ments vector Za = Z + a, in which vector a represents the
malicious data added to actual measurements, is able to bypass
residual-based BDDs if it is a linear combination of the column
vectors of the Jacobin matrix H . Therefore, the authors in [1]
have defined a = Hc, in which c is the error generated by the
attacker, and proved the incapability of residual-based BDDs
to detect this attack vector a:
Proof: Assume that the estimated states vector after adding
the vector a to the actual measurements vector Z is xˆa =
xˆ + c then the 2-norm of the residual after the attack is
Ra = ||Za − Hxˆa||. After substituting Za with Z + a and
xˆa with xˆ + c the 2-norm of the residual is converted to
Ra = ||Z − Hxˆ + (a − Hc)||. With the first and main
assumption in the theorem that a = Hc and the assumption
that the original measurements before the attack can pass the
BDD the following Eq. II.3 is true.
Ra = R = ||Z −Hxˆ|| < τ (II.3)
B. LR Attacks
Every LR attack starts by falsifying bus injection mea-
surements. In this paper, it is assumed that the attackers
in LR attacks avoid changing the measurements related to
generation part since the control center directly communicates
with the power plant control room, which could cause an easy
detection. Moreover, there might be some buses with zero
injection, which implies no change in injection of these buses.
In this paper, the only way to affect the power system is
to increase the loads at some buses and decrease the loads at
some other buses in such a way that the total load remains
unchanged (operator can easily detect an LR attack if the
net change in the loads is not zero as this will easily affect
the system frequency). Likewise, attackers should change
the line power flow measurements to match and follow the
load measurement changes [14]. In addition to the mentioned
constraints, attackers in LR attacks are limited to deviate the
load at each bus to be neither more or less than a constant
expected value (which is usually determined by a percentage
of original load value at each bus) since the operator would
flag any set of load measurements that deviates far from
the short-term load forecasting. At the end, after generating
an undetectable LR attack, the security-constrained economic
dispatch (SCED) is fed by a contaminated set of loads, and
provides a set of fake dispatch points that leads the system to
an insecure or inefficient operating state.
Referring to [16], a bi-level LR attack problem with limited
access to specific meters is illustrated in in Fig. 1. The upper-
level objective is to maximize the power flow on a target line,
while 1) the number of attacker’s resources is limited by N1
and 2) the attacker can change the load at each bus just within
a certain range, which is defined by ±α percent of the original
load at each bus. The lower-level problem is a direct current
optimal power flow (DCOPF) problem that models the system
response to the attack vector.
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Upper-level objective: Maximize the physical power flow  
on a target line l 
𝑀𝑎𝑥 𝑃𝑙 = ∑ 𝑃𝑇𝐷𝐹𝑙,𝑖
𝑅 (∑ ?̅?𝑔𝑔∈𝐺(𝑖) − 𝐿𝑖) 𝑖∈𝑁   
1) Limits on amount of deviation for each load at each bus 
−∝ 𝐿𝑖  ≤ 𝐻𝑖
′𝑐 ≤∝ 𝐿𝑖 
2) Limit on the number of states that can be changed 
||𝑐||1 ≤ 𝑁1 
 
Lower-level objective: Minimize the total operation cost 
𝑀𝑖𝑛 𝐶𝑇 = ∑ 𝑐𝑔𝑃𝑔𝑔∈𝐺   
3) System-wide power balance constraint 
∑ 𝑃𝑔𝑔∈𝐺 = ∑ 𝐿𝑖𝑖∈𝑁   
4) Limits on generation output of each unit 
𝑃𝑔
𝑚𝑖𝑛 ≤ 𝑃𝑔 ≤ 𝑃𝑔
𝑚𝑎𝑥  
5) Limits on thermal capacity of each line 
−𝑃𝑘
𝑚𝑎𝑥 ≤ ∑ 𝑃𝑇𝐷𝐹𝑘,𝑖
𝑅 (∑ ?̅?𝑔𝑔∈𝐺(𝑖) −  𝐿𝑖  + 𝐻𝑖
′𝑐) 𝑖∈𝑁 ≤ 𝑃𝑘
𝑚𝑎𝑥   
 
Fig. 1. A bi-level model for generating an LR attack with limited access to
meters [16]
III. MODELING AND METHODOLOGY
There are some drawbacks associated to protection-based
countermeasures such as 1) reducing measurement redundancy
[36] and 2) possibility of launching an attack even when all
measurements have been protected [32]. Therefore, in this
paper, we propose a detection-based countermeasure and show
that the process of identification of LR attacks in power
systems can be done using a deep knowledge of power
systems. In this section, at first, an exploitable structure for
LR attack problems is demonstrated, which is called the core
problem of LR attack problems. Then, the mechanism to detect
LR attacks is developed and described based on the provided
proof, which shows a greedy algorithm is able to solve the
proposed core problem for LR attacks, to optimality.
A. The Core Problem of LR Attack Problems
An LR attack actually moves the loads up and down in
such a way that the attacker achieves the maximum damage
based on her/his goal. Obviously, changing the load pattern
will affect line flows in any system; power transfer distribution
factors (PTDFs) or shift factors (SFs) are the factors that
determine what fraction of the injection at each bus will flow
across a specific line or flowgate with respect to withdrawal
from reference bus R. For instance, assume a particular line
is overloaded by 20 MW, the operator will take a generator
at a bus that has an SF for that line at 0.5 and move it
by −20 MW while then also taking a different generator at
another bus that has an SF for that line at −0.5 and move
it by 20 MW that would result in a precise change in the
4line’s flow by −20 MW and the overall change in supply
would be 0 MW. In conclusion, the trivial approach for the
operator who wants to reduce the flow on a line is to rank
all PTDFs with flexible resources from largest to smallest (the
most positive to the most negative). Then, the operator simply
starts reducing the net injection of the resource at the top
and simultaneously (MW for MW) increasing the resource at
the bottom. If either resource runs out of capacity she/he just
moves to the next resource on that end and continues until the
overload disappears. The essence of the attackers’ approach
is also the same as the operator problem while attackers are
limited by the amount of changes they can apply to the original
resources to avoid being detected.
According to the mentioned practice in the industry and
PTDFs concept, there is a very clear way to define the core
problem of LR attack problems, which attempt to maximize a
line’s overload (in a proper direction) relative to the flexibility
of resources (amount of acceptable load change at each bus)
throughout the system. Hence, the optimization problem III.1-
III.3 is modeled and defined as the core problem of LR attack
problems.
maximize
H
′
i
ci
±
∑
i∈N
(H
′
ici)PTDF
R
l,i (III.1)
s.t. − αLi ≤ H
′
ici ≤ αLi, i ∈ N (III.2)∑
i∈N
H
′
ici = 0 (III.3)
Where PTDFRl,i is the vector of power transfer distribution
factors for the target branch l ∈ K with respect to the injection
at bus i ∈ N and withdrawal from the reference bus R. H ′ici
(∆Li) is the false deviation generated by the attacker for the
load at bus i ∈ N . α and Li represent the load shift factor
and fixed active load at bus i ∈ N , respectively.
In this problem, the main decision variables are the bus
net injection deviations (again, it is assumed that attackers
only change load measurements and are not able to change
generation measurements) and the objective is to maximize
the overload on the target transmission line subject to the
attackers’ limitations to change the resources throughout the
system. Constraints in III.2 impose the deviation at each bus
to be neither more or less than a constant percentage of the
original load at that bus (they also impose no change at zero
injection buses), and constraint III.3 makes sure that the net
load in the system after the LR attack remains unchanged.
In this study, linear optimal power flow models have been
considered; this work is extendable for non-convex alternative
current optimal power flow (ACOPF) formulations since the
underlying special structure in the classical DCOPF is caused
by KVL and KCL, which remain present in all OPFs.
In the following, the impact of two different LR attacks on
a 3-bus system (Fig 2) is illustrated.
All buses have generation units and bus C is the reference
bus. Minimum and maximum capacities of all three units are 0
and 150 MW, respectively. Assume that the attacker takes line
1 as the target line and generates two different LR attacks to
maximize the overload on this line based on two different load
shift factors (5%, 10%). For this example, at first, we solved
A B
C
30 MW
(1)
(2)
(3)
Z
2Z
2Z
100 MW100 MW
~
$70/
MWh
~
$80/
MWh
~
$50/
MWh
Fig. 2. 3-bus test case diagram
the problem III.1-III.3 to find the best attack vector, then, using
the generated attack vector, we modified loads in the system
and run the DCOPF problem, which provides dispatch points
in Table I. Secondly, we used the resulted dispatch points to
run DC power flow (DCPF) while we considered actual loads
to find the actual physical flows on all transmission lines,
which are demonstrated in Table I.
In case 1, when α is 5%, malicious deviations (∆LA =
+5 MW, ∆LB = -5 MW) lead the DCOPF to provide a set
of insecure dispatch points (PGA = 142.5 MW, P
G
B = 57.5
MW, and PGC = 0). According to the actual loads (LA =
100 MW, LB = 100 MW), this set of fake dispatch points
causes P target1 = 34 MW, P
k
2 = -8.5 MW, and P
k
3 = 8.5 MW,
which show 13.3% overload on line 1. In case 2, when α
is 10%, the same simulation was repeated and this time the
line flows are P target1 = 38 MW, P
k
2 = -9.5 MW, and P
k
3 =
9.5 MW, which show 26.6% overload on line 1. The results
demonstrate that as the attack’s energy increases (α increases)
the damage could be more significant, which in some point
in time could cause the target line trips offline and results
in a cascading blackout. However, there should be a trade-off
between the attack’s energy and the detection probability since
as the energy increases the detection probability increases.
TABLE I. Cyber and Physical results after two different LR attacks on the
target line 1 in the 3-bus test case
Attack Scenarios
α = %5 α = %10
Cyber
Results
LA (MW) 105 LA (MW) 110
LB (MW) 95 LB (MW) 90
LRef (MW) 0 LRef (MW) 0
P g1 (MW) 142.5 P
g
1 (MW) 147.5
P g2 (MW) 57.5 P
g
2 (MW) 52.5
P g3 (MW) 0 P
g
3 (MW) 0
P target1 (MW) 30 P
target
1 (MW) 30
Cost ($) 11725 Cost ($) 11575
Physical
Results
P target1 (MW) 34 > 30 P
target
1 (MW) 38 > 30
Pk2 (MW) -8.5 P
k
2 (MW) -9.5
Pk3 (MW) 8.5 P
k
3 (MW) 9.5
B. Proving the Application of a Greedy Algorithm to Solve
the Proposed Core Problem of LR Attacks
After identifying a core problem for LR attacks, the second
contribution of this study is to prove that this problem, which
is a variant of the fractional knapsack problem [45] from an
operations research perspective, can be solved to optimality
with a greedy algorithm. In this regard, the application of
greedy algorithms to solve the problem III.1-III.3 to optimality
has been proved and presented in this section.
5Greedy algorithms attempt to build up a solution to a
mathematical problem by making a sequence of choices. These
choices are dependent on each other, and the previous choices
in the solving process affect the other choices that can be
made later in the process. Considering the values of possible
choices at each step, a greedy algorithm selects the best local
choice. This choice is called a greedy choice, and the resulting
algorithm is called a greedy algorithm. Greedy algorithms
produce good solutions for some mathematical problems. As
an example, it provides the global optimum for the fractional
knapsack problem [45].
In the following, a mathematical proof is presented to
demonstrate that a greedy algorithm can solve the problem
III.1-III.3 to optimality. After applying a greedy algorithm
to solve this problem, at least one of the decision variables
(∆Li) is either at its lower bound (li) or upper bound (ui),
so optimality follows from the lemma below.
Lemma: Feasible solution (∆L1, ...,∆Lnb) is optimal if
and only if, whenever PTDFRl,i > PTDF
R
l,j , we find that
∆Li = ui or ∆Lj = lj (or both).
Proof: → Suppose by contradiction that there is an optimal
solution for which PTDFRl,i > PTDF
R
l,j , ∆Li < ui, and
∆Lj > lj . Compute δ = min(ui −∆Li,∆Lj − lj). Adding
δ to ∆Li and subtracting it from ∆Lj gives another feasible
solution, but
∑nb
t ∆LtPTDF
R
l,t increases by δ(PTDF
R
l,i −
PTDFRl,j), which is positive. Hence the solution cannot be
optimal.
← Suppose by contradiction S = (∆L1, ...,∆Lnb) is a
feasible solution for which whenever PTDFRl,i > PTDF
R
l,j ,
∆Li = ui or ∆Lj = lj , but is not an optimal solution.
Choose an optimal solution O = (y1, ..., ynb) in which the
number of times that ∆Lt 6= yt, (t ∈ N ), is as small as
possible. Note that
∑nb
t ytPTDF
R
l,t >
∑nb
t ∆LtPTDF
R
l,t.
Because
∑nb
t yt =
∑nb
t ∆Lt = 0 there is an item a for
which ya > ∆La and another item b for which yb < ∆Lb.
It follows that ∆La < ua and ∆Lb > lb (by the conditions
that S satisfies), and hence that PTDFRl,a ≤ PTDFRl,b. Let
δ = min(ya − ∆La,∆Lb − yb). In O, subtract δ from
ya and add δ to yb, to get a feasible solution O′ that
changes
∑nb
i yiPTDF
R
l,i by δ(PTDF
R
l,b − PTDFRl,a). Now
if PTDFRl,a < PTDF
R
l,b, O
′ yields a larger sum that does O;
this contradicts the optimality of O. So this must mean that
PTDFRl,a = PTDF
R
l,b. Then O
′ is also optimal, but by con-
struction has fewer items than O in which it disagrees with S;
this contradicts the requirement that O is an optimal solution
with fewest such differences. Therefore, it is concluded that
no such O can exist, and hence that S is optimal.
This proof for global optimality results in developing a
mechanism to predict the attacker’s move and find the sensitive
locations, given a target asset. In fact, this proof shows that the
proposed core problem is solvable by a trivial sorting approach
and there is no reason to solve any complicated problem
for the operator to detect LR attacks since the attacker’s
strategy is strikingly simple and trivial for this type of attack.
By using this mechanism, the operator can determine the
sensitive locations for any vulnerable asset and track the
changes at these sensitive locations to flag any dangerous set
of changes that contributes to overload that asset, which makes
it impossible for the attacker to obtain a global solution (and
also making it hard to obtain near optimality). Therefore, the
attacker has to introduce some form of randomness to avoid
being detected. It is predictable that even though the attacker
can create a situation where randomness is applied to his/her
strategy, so much of the feasible space is cut off by the attack
detection mechanism that the resulting impact of this class of
attacks is rendered to be very low.
IV. SIMULATION AND RESULTS
Here, we investigated the performance of our presented
approach using an illustrative example in IV-A and a realistic
system (2383-bus Polish system) in IV-B.
A. Illustrative Test Case
Here, for more clarification the proposed procedure was
applied to the small IEEE 6-bus test case in Fig. 3. In this
experiment, we generated two random vectors (a1 and a2) in
such a way that one of them is an attack vector and the other is
not; then, we used our proposed mechanism to find the attack
vector.
 
Fig. 3. 6-Bus test case diagram
Both vectors are samples from a normal distribution, but
the one that is the attack is simply arranged in such a way
that causes an overload on the vulnerable line from bus 3 to
bus 5 (line 3-5); this is the basic technique of an unobservable
attack: have the deviations fall into the potential spectrum of
generally accepted noise error but have the preferred values be
at preferred buses. All required information including amount
of load at each bus, PTDF values of all buses with respect to
line 3-5, vector a1, and vector a2 are shown in Table II.
TABLE II. Two randomly generated vectors representing net injection changes
at buses in the 6-Bus system: ordered by bus number
Bus load (MW) PTDF a1 (MW) a2 (MW)
1 10 0 -0.456 0.976
2 15 0.0622 -0.127 -0.954
3 15 0.289 1.136 1.143
4 30 0.0183 -0.564 -2.051
5 20 -0.1207 -0.751 1.519
6 10 0.1526 0.762 -0.633
The detection process starts by solving the problem III.1-
III.3 by the greedy algorithm (Algorithm 1) to find the best
attack vector for line 3-5, which determines the most sensitive
buses associated to this line. In Algorithm 1, at first all buses
are sorted based on their PTDF absolute values in a descending
order. Then, considering α = 10%, the maximum possible
deviation (assume that line 3-5’s initial flow is positive) is
assigned to each bus from the top to the end, while at each
6Algorithm 1 The greedy algorithm that is used to optimize the problem III.1-
III.3
Input: The vectors of N upper bounds (ub), lower bounds (lb), and (PTDFs) for
all load buses relative to target line.
Output: A vector of N deviations (xi) in loads at all load buses.
1: X ← 0
2: x[i]← ub[i]
3: for <i← 1 to N> do
4: Sorted PTDF ← Sort PTDFs in a descending order.
5: X ← X + ub[i]
6: end for
7: for <j : Sorted-PTDF> do
8: if Flow[target−line] ≤ 0 then
9: if (x[j]− lb[j]) ≤ X then
10: X ← X − (x[j]− lb[j])
11: x[j]← lb[j]
12: else
13: x[j]← (x[j]−X)
14: X ← 0
15: end if
16: else
17: if (x[j]− lb[j]) ≤ X then
18: X ← X − (x[j]− lb[j])
19: x[j]← ub[j]
20: else
21: x[j]← (X − x[j])
22: X ← 0
23: end if
24: end if
25: return x[j]
26: end for
step constraints III.2 and III.3 have to be satisfied. The resulted
best attack vector is achieved and demonstrated in Table III.
Also, PTDF values, vector a1, and vector a2 are reordered and
shown in Table III.
TABLE III. Two randomly generated vectors representing net injection
changes at buses in the 6-Bus system: ordered based on the PTDFs
Bus load(MW) PTDF Best Attack(MW) a1(MW) a2(MW)
3 15 0.289 1.5 1.136 1.143
6 10 0.1526 1.0 0.762 -0.633
5 20 -0.1207 -2.0 -0.751 1.519
2 15 0.0622 1.5 -0.127 -0.954
4 30 0.0183 -1.0 -0.564 -2.051
1 10 0 -1.0 -0.456 0.976
According to Table III, a1 has 3 deviations (at buses 3, 6,
and 5) out of 4 deviations at the most sensitive buses (buses
3, 6, 5 and 2) with proper directions to cause an overload
on line 3-5 (assume PTDFs with absolute values below 0.05
are assumed to be zero). On the other hand, a2 has just 1
deviation (bus 3) out of 4 deviations at the most sensitive
buses with proper direction, which shows that vector a1 is the
attack vector with 0.5165 MW difference between cyber and
physical flow on this line.
 
Fig. 4. 6-Bus test case diagram with the attackers’ preferred load deviations
spectrum to overload line 3-5 and the a1’s load deviations spectrum: left side
circles are related to a1 and right side circles are related to best attack vector
Fig. 4 visually shows and compares the best attack and the
random attack a1, where the circles at the left side of the buses
show the load deviations related to a1 and the circles at the
right side of the buses show the load deviations related to best
attack vector (larger circle indicates more sensitive bus).
B. Case Study on the Modified 2383-Bus Polish Test System
The original 2383-Bus Polish Test System is available in
[46]. The modifications include: decreasing the line ratings to
create base case attacks; and set the negative loads to zero. In
this section, multiple evaluations have been done. At first an
attack vector was generated for line 168 by solving problem
III.1-III.3 two times; one time by the GUROBI solver and one
time by the greedy algorithm, which numerically demonstrates
the capability of the greedy algorithm to optimize the core
problem and get the same results as the GUROBI solver
gets. For the second study, the effectiveness of the generated
attack vector was tested by 1) the Enhanced Malicious Load
Deviation Index (EMLDI) proposed in [47] and 2) showing
the flow results on line 168 after the attack by doing the
same simulation that was done in section III-A. At last, the
capability of the proposed detection mechanism to distinguish
noise vectors from attack vectors as well as its ability to detect
effective random attacks have been demonstrated.
1) Solving the Problem III.1-III.3 by Two Methods; the
GUROBI Solver and the Greedy Algorithm: In this subsection,
capability of the greedy algorithm to solve the core problem to
optimality is demonstrated by comparing the results of solving
the problem III.1-III.3 by the GUROBI solver and the results
from the greedy algorithm. For the sake of this discussion,
we solved the problem III.1-III.3 for line 168 while α is 10%
under JAVA on an Intel(R) Xeon(R) CPU with 48 GB of RAM.
The resulted attack vectors from both methods are perfectly
matched each other as it is shown in Fig. 5 for some of the
most sensitive buses. It should be noted that the GUROBI
solves the problem III.1-III.3 in 127 ms, which is 120 ms
longer than what takes for the greedy algorithm to solve
this problem with the same results. This result indicates the
efficiency of using the greedy solver in 5-minute operational
interval EMSs.
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Fig. 5. Malicious load deviations at some of the most sensitive buses with
respect to the target line 168 in the 2383-Bus Polish system: achieved by
solving the problem III.1-III.3 using both the GUROBI and greedy solvers
2) Attack Efficiency Analysis Using EMLDI: In this sub-
section, the efficiency of the generated attack that could put
the system in danger has been demonstrated by calculating
the EMLDI value and also by showing the physical line flow
after the attack on the target line. EMLDI is an index that is
7recently proposed to measure the effect of load deviations on
each vulnerable asset in the system. It utilizes load deviation
in MW at each bus and the value of each bus relative to
the asset under evaluation (PTDF) to flag any set of load
changes that contribute to increase the flow on a target branch.
Table IV illustrates different intervals for ELMDI value and
corresponding alert-level based on the definition in [47].
TABLE IV. Interpretation of different EMLDI values [47]
EMLDI < 0.20 > 0.20 > 0.35 > 0.50
Alert-Level Normal Monitor Warning Danger
With respect to the generated attack vector for line 168,
EMLDI is 0.9629. Clearly, this EMLDI value shows the ef-
fectiveness of the attack vector according to the alert-intervals
in Table IV.
Likewise, Table V provides line flow results, including the
cyber flow, physical flow, and amount of the overload for the
best attack (global solution).
TABLE V. Cyber flow, physical flow, and amount of overload on line 168
after the attack in the 2383-Bus Polish system
Line No. 118
Continuous Line Rating (MW) 926.62
Cyber Flow (MW) -926.62
Physical Flow (MW) -1178.136
Overload (MW) 251.516
The cyber flow in Table V (resulted from solving DCOPF
and fake loads) shows that there is no overload on the target
line in cyber world (what the operator sees), while the physical
flow (resulted from solving DCPF, actual loads, and fake
dispatch points) shows 251.516 MW of overload on this line
(what the attacker desires).
3) Detection Mechanism Efficiency Analysis: In this sec-
tion, a study has been conducted to show 1) the efficiency
of the proposed mechanism to detect malicious changes that
have enough energy to put the system in danger 2) the ability
of the proposed mechanism to distinguish noisy errors from
malicious changes in loads. To sake of this discussion, 2000
vectors representing changes in net injection for all 2383
buses, except zero injection buses, were generated, where 1000
vectors were malicious vectors; given line 168 as the target
line; with a form of randomness (they were randomly modified
to not match the best attack vector) while the other 1000
vectors were samples from normal distributions. To generate
1000 random attack vectors, each time we 1) multiplied α
(10%) to a random number between 0.8 and 0.9, which
condensed the feasible region of the original problem, 2) added
a constraint to the problem III.1-III.3 to force the changes at
200 randomly selected sensitive locations (for line 168) to
be zero, and 3) solved the new modified III.1-III.3 to have
a random attack vector. The other 1000 Gaussian random
vectors (µ = 0, δ = αL/3) were generated in such a way
that 1) deviation at each bus could not be more or less than a
minimum/maximum acceptable values, 2) there was no change
at zero injection buses, and 3) the net load change in the
system was very small.
Fig. 6 depicts physical flows on line 168 as the impact of
each of 2000 vectors versus the number of proper changes
at sensitive locations (to make the line 168 overloaded). To
get the results in Fig. 6, each time 1) we added one of the
2000 vectors to the original load vector and found the fake
load vector, then 2) based on the resulted fake load vector
we ran DCOPF and found the fake dispatch points, and at
the end 3) we ran DCPF by considering the resulted fake
dispatch points and the original loads before adding either
of random attack or noise error vector to the original load
vector to find the physical flow on line 168 as the impact of
each vector. Likewise, we did a comparison between each of
the 2000 vectors and the attackers’ preferred spectrum (best
attack vector), achieved in section IV-B1, to find the number
of proper deviations (deviations with proper directions and
enough magnitudes) at the most sensitive buses for each vector.
All of the random attack vectors (red dots) cause physical
overflows on the line 168 and the Gaussian random vectors
(blue dots) are not able to cause physical overloads on this
line. Therefore, according to the large difference between the
number of proper deviations at sensitive locations for random
attacks and noisy errors in Fig. 6, it is concluded that the
proposed mechanism can distinguish random attacks from
noisy errors and detect them.
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Fig. 6. Physical impact of 1000 random attacks and 1000 Gaussian random
vectors (µ = 0, δ = αL/3) on the target line 168 versus the number of
proper deviations at sensitive locations in 2383-Bus Polish system
V. CONCLUSION
Cyber-security increasingly draws people’s attention in a
variety of areas in power systems. Inability of existing bad
data detectors to detect all falsely injected data makes the
problem critical and worrisome. In this study, by using deeper
understanding of power systems, a non-probabilistic intelligent
false data detector that reduces the risk of LR attacks and their
impacts is introduced, designed, and evaluated. We first used
power systems domain insights and PTDFs concept to identify
an exploitable model for the core problem of LR attacks, then,
by proving that a simple greedy algorithm is able to solve
this model to optimality, the proposed detection mechanism is
designed to find the most sensitive locations in power systems
with respect to their impact on a target asset. Likewise, at the
end, the efficiency of this detection mechanism to detect some
energy-reduced random attacks and its ability to distinguish
malicious changes from noise errors are shown. Besides the
simple nature of this detection mechanism, which reduces the
8computational complexities with respect to many potential
vulnerabilities in a large network, this method could be a
perfect complement for other detection mechanisms.
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